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The present study asks whether the enforcement of competition protection, according to
Art. 101, 102 and 106 TFEU, causes conﬂict with measures belonging to the EU's social
market economy model. Integration of the social market economy objective into the EU's
goals was newly stated in Article 3 (3) TFEU and it is therefore of interest to ﬁnd whether
it has have so far any impact on the traditional EU's competition law approach towards
clashes between social protection measures and free competition imperatives. The study
reviews ﬁrst the new wording of social provisions of the EU Treaties, then it analysis the
relationship between the social market economy model and the market competition in
general. A more detailed attention is then dedicated to the pre-Lisbon approach of the EU
Court of Justice towards agreements between social partners and to the privileged rights
of organisations providing social security services. In its ﬁnal part, the study examines
whether this earlier established approach corresponds to the current post-Lisbon case law
of the Court. The conclusion is that even though the goal of a social market economy has
been so far never mentioned by the Court and its pre-Lisbon case law precedents have not
been overruled, the current standard of application of EU competition rules is largely
responsive towards social schemes established at the national level.
& 2015 Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the approval of the EU Lisbon Treaty, which took place simultaneously with the outbreak of the ﬁnancial and
economic crisis, the issue of social rights and protection measures has been back in the spotlight at national and EU levels. In
terms of EU law this reinforced accent on the social aspects has been directly required by numerous new provisions of the
EU Treaties, in particular by the formulation of Article 3(3) TFEU which stipulates that the EU should follow the path leading
towards a highly competitive social market economy with full employment etc. At ﬁrst glance, we are witnessing a turnover
from the neoliberal emphasis on deregulation, liberalisation and free competition, so popular at the turn of the century, to
the values of social peace, socially and ecologically sustainable development etc. The question naturally arises whether the
complex and sophisticated EU competition law, which in the late 1990s became an important tool for promoting an eco-
nomic model based just on liberalisation and undistorted competition, does not stand in direct opposition to such a reversal.
Our analysis addresses these concerns on two levels. First, from the perspective of the theory it looks at the place of free
competition in the concept of social market economy, as developed in the economic theory and practice of the post-war
West Germany. On this theoretical level, it is especially necessary to separate the social market economy concept from theuction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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scope of their correction by State measures. The social market economy model however, by admitting the introduction of
market forces into formerly State-controlled sectors, expands the scope of potential conﬂicts between the free market
competition and the emphasis on the protection of those social rights, which cannot be sacriﬁced to economic efﬁciency.
Hence, secondly, the need for a more detailed review of the case law of the EU Court of Justice (CJ), which is the ﬁnal
authority for dealing with situations in which the values protected by various provisions of EU law interfere. The goal is to
ascertain whether the objective of the social market economy and other socially oriented provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
have created new sources of conﬂict with the EU policy against cartels and abuses of dominance and to ﬁnd out the way in
which these conﬂict have been solved by CJ.1 In order to compare the pre-Lisbon and the post-Lisbon solutions an outline of
the traditional (pre-Lisbon) jurisprudence of CJ in the given area needs to be drafted ﬁrst. It will be shown that the CJ´s
solutions were neither simple nor uniform as they were built on more than one type of justiﬁcation that allowed the
fulﬁllment of social goals. From this base it will be then researched if there has been, during the 2009–2015 period, any shift
in the EU's standard of application of Articles 101 (prohibition of Cartels), 102 (prohibition of abuse of the dominant features
of position), and also 106 (services of general economic interest) TFEU that would preclude the maintenance and devel-
opment of social protection measures, of social dialogue outcomes, or of other aspects associated with the model of social
market economy.
The following paragraphs, therefore, look at whether and how the EU law has succeeded so far in balancing the liberal
and social values and has managed to open the way to an order of social market economy that would be both socially just
and highly competitive.2. The EU's social market economy goal as a speciﬁc problem
Although the Lisbon Treaty has already been in force for more than ﬁve years, some debates about the issues it has raised
have still not faded away. One of them concerns the new EU target, set by Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU), that of a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress… This has been
supplemented by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) by a number of other provisions testifying to the Union's
increased interest in social rights and their protection. These are, in particular, the “social” horizontal clause of Article 9 TFEU
exhorting the EU to promote a high level of employment in all its policies, the guarantee of adequate social protection, and
the ﬁght against social exclusion… as well as the similarly worded rights mainly contained in Chapter IV of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, entitled “Solidarity”. In a similar vein, another provision of general application should also be
mentioned, that of 14 TFEU, stressing the importance of services of general economic interest “in the shared values of the
Union”, together with the related Protocol No. 26 On services of general interest and the fundamental right of access to them
referred to in Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. All these provisions of EU primary law reﬂect important
principles for the future operation and direction of the Union, but they do not establish any directly enforceable social rights
of individuals or any binding commitment among the Member States to build a harmonised European social model.2
Title X of the TFEU, entitled “Social Policy” (Articles 153 and 156 TFEU, in particular) that could have contained such a
speciﬁc mandate and set of directly claimable rights, was not changed by the Lisbon Treaty, and thus does not allow the EU
to do more than “support and complement” the activities of the Member States in the ﬁelds of labour and social security
law. In all key issues (social security and the social protection of workers, the collective defence of the interests of workers,
etc.), the Member States have retained the right of veto in the Council. The principles of social security systems (the degree
of solidarity and redistribution, the involvement of social partners, etc.), and matters regarding remuneration, the right of
association, and the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs, are not even subject to EU harmonisation powers.3 The1 State aid control is not included in the study, partly due to the fact that the European Commission recently clariﬁed the question in its Commission
Staff Working Document - Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of
general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest (European Commission, 2013).
2 The adjective “social”, whether in regard to policy or model, does not have a precisely deﬁned content. In a broad sense, which is often used by the
EU, it includes “all areas of social policy” (see Article 156 TFEU). It includes the coordination of employment measures, as well as labour rights and working
conditions, training and further education, social security, protection against occupational accidents and diseases, health and safety at work, the right to
associate in professional organisations and the right to collective bargaining between employers and employees. It is therefore about individual and
collective entitlements, ranging from labour law through the regulation of the labour market and job training, to social protection or security, i.e. to the
systematic hedging against risks in professional and everyday life (sickness and maternity beneﬁts, invalidity beneﬁts, including those intended for the
maintenance or improvement of earning capacity, old-age beneﬁts, survivors’ beneﬁts, beneﬁts in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases,
death grants, unemployment beneﬁts, and family beneﬁts) – as they were originally deﬁned in Art 4 (1) of EEC Regulation 1408/71 as referred to constantly
by the CJ in its rulings, for instance, in C-78/91 para 15, (Rose Hughes v Chief Adjudication Ofﬁcer, 1992).
3 The EU has been granted its own initiative in the ﬁeld of social security by Article 48 TFEU, albeit limited to social security for migrant workers. For
them, the EU aims to “create a system” that, however, does not consist in the payment of “European beneﬁts from the European budget,” but instead, in the
coordination between national social security systems, so that migrant workers do not lose their entitlements acquired in different Member States and
their respective beneﬁts are paid to them in the country where they are resident. Historically, this is a result of the founding compromise under which the
EU (then the EEC) was granted powers to regulate and deregulate the market (including the free movement of workers), while social security remained in
the hands of the Member States, in the hope that economic growth would strengthen market integration and solve social issues. For more details, see Grass
(2013), p. 83, 83–87).
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provided by the Member States, mainly in the ﬁelds of public health, social security and education (for more for details, see
European Commission (2011)) from the scope of the Treaties (and therefore of EU law). Just from this short overview, it is
clear that the Lisbon Treaty does not support its objective of a social market economy with corresponding powers to act in
the ﬁeld of social rights and social security. The EU's wide competence to shape trade and business within its single market
has not been complemented so far by similar competencies to actively promote its own socio-economic model. The
objective itself looks like an example of a frequent EU weakness, when it states in big words “what”, without giving a hint as
to “how” (Giddens, 2014, p. 70).
The answer to the question of “how” the social market economy objective should be fulﬁlled, therefore, remains unclear
and has become a source of controversy. The EU Court of Justice, which can clarify the provisions of the Treaty that the
legislators left without content, neither uses the reference to the social market economy goal as an argument, nor deﬁnes it
in its judgments in terms of content and related measures. The European Commission seems to be more responsive in this
regard, but only at a general level. It explains the aim of Article 3 (3) TEU as being an expression of the need for balance and
sustainability of the model that is Europe's own and that is based on two complementary pillars: “on the one hand, the
enforcement of competition, and on the other, social policy measures to guarantee social justice by correcting negative
outcomes and bolster[ing] social protection.” (Andor, 2011). Andor included in the social dimension the rules on working
conditions, individual workers' rights, the objective of full employment, and social dialogue. That broadly conforms to the
fundamental basis of a model of post-war West Germany, rooted in the Freiburg school of Ordoliberalism and the social
doctrine of the Christian Democrats. It does not, however, bring us closer to an answer to the question of what speciﬁc
actions, at what level, with what degree of European harmonisation, should be adopted and implemented to achieve the
objective of Article 3 (3) TEU. Therefore, it is no wonder that the majority view of scientiﬁc literature says that the current
EU has no clearly and uniformly deﬁned socio-economic model at all (Giddens, 2014, p. 90; Potucek, 2014, p. 141).
This is not a purely academic debate, because practical experience shows that liberal, market-oriented values are not
always in harmony with the values of social solidarity and that national models of social peace sometimes come into conﬂict
with the freedoms of the EU single market.4 Since Europe is composed of several national or regional social models and the
EU has no powers or resources in the budget to offer as their substitute or as an optional alternative to a common EUmodel,
there are plenty of situations in which the right of free movement of services or non-discriminatory participation in pro-
curement procedures exert pressure on social protection schemes based on a local compromise between labour and capital.
These situations have been broadly discussed, mainly in connexion with the CJ judgments in cases C-341/05 Laval, C-438/05
Viking and C-346/06 Rüffert (Bücker & Warneck, 2010). This paper focuses on the conﬂicts between similar principles, but in
particular, between the social security schemes and EU competition rules, which are to a greater extent than single market
rules, uniﬁed and conferred as the exclusive competence of the EU.5
Such a potential conﬂict between the new social accent of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU's competition policy and law, was
brieﬂy given increased media attention at the time of the ﬁnalisation of the text of the Treaty, in mid-2007. Former French
President N. Sarkozy then succeeded in expelling the provision stating that the goal of the Union is “a single market with
free and undistorted competition” from the “constitutional”, horizontally operating provisions of the Treaties (La con-
currence libre et non-faussée a vecu dans l´UE – The free competition and undistorted competition are over in the EU, 2007).
Thanks to the addition of Protocol No. 27 On the Internal Market and Competition and then to the conservative approach of
the CJ, which refused to question the “fundamental nature of the Treaty provisions on competition” (Italian Republic v
European Commission, 2011), there has been no displacement of the protection of competition on the second track between
the EU policies. Clearly, however, this political event showed that a strong antitrust inspired by neoclassical economics not
only disappointed the EU's left and the trade unions, but that there were also right-wing political forces that did not share
the enthusiasm for the “Anglo-Saxon” free-market and its spontaneous self-regulation. On the other hand, the ﬁnancial,
economic and ultimately debt crises that plagued the EU in the years following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, did not
bring victory of the social over the free market in the EU. The problems of the welfare state, caused by the erosion of many
assumptions on which its postwar success had been built, have not yet found a satisfactory solution and the pressure of
“austerity” on its expensive and solidarity requiring schemes of social security and health insurance has not diminished.3. The social market model and free competition
Before analysing the conﬂicting aspects of the social market economy and EU competition law, it is necessary to
remember that the historical and also the current interpretation of the social market economy concept is not identical to the
well-known leftist “welfare state”, and is not therefore, hostile to the vigorous enforcement of competition law. The4 It is sometimes called the “Janusian character of the EU”, as the efforts towards further liberalisation, deregulation, ﬂexibility and economic efﬁciency
and competitiveness are increasingly at odds with the ideals of social justice and social rights, participative prosperity, the ﬁght against poverty and social
exclusion. For more details, see Potucek (2014), p. 142–143 and Grass (2013), p. 14–15, 21–24.
5 Under Article 3(1) TFEU, the establishment of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market belongs to the exclusive
powers of the EU, while the internal market as such as well as the social policy form part of the powers shared between EU and Member states pursuant to
Article 4(2) TFEU.
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words of another former Commissioner – for Competition – Monti, according to whom the social market economy “calls for
a maximum of free market, for reliance on competition wherever possible” (Monti, 2000).
Looking back, one cannot forget the strong warning of one of the key ﬁgures of the postwar social market economy in
Germany, Ludwig Erhard, against a collectivist welfare state. This model of social policy was structurally different from his
concept and signiﬁed in his eyes, a slide into a “social order under which everyone has one hand in the pocket of another”
(Erhard, 1957). According to Erhard, it was not possible for an economic order to exclude private initiative, foresight and
responsibility, although it should not have simultaneously meant a value-neutral attitude of the State, as it was the public
duty to carry out social policy that would be closely tuned to economic policy. A similar approach was taken by the author of
the term ‘social economy’, Alfred Müller-Armack, who in the postwar era promoted the market conformity of all social
measures, which meant, on the one hand, the rejection of state-guaranteed social and health insurance as well as of the
enactment of a minimum wage, and on the other hand, the preference for social security built primarily on individual
responsibility, not on a mandatory solidarity among social classes and generations (for more details Zweig (1980)). At the
same time, the “effective and workable” or even “complete” competition represented by the founding fathers of the concept
of the social market economy, the very foundation of the economic order, most importantly, needed to be vigorously
protected from restrictions caused by both market operators and state power (Crane & Hovenkamp, 2013, p. 252–281).
It is obvious that if social security insurance were individually ﬁnanced (albeit with mandatory participation), and
provided by competing market players, while the state would reduce its active role to e.g. a negative income tax for low-
income families plus limited ﬁnancial support of the neediest, such a system, by its very nature, would not clash much with
the competition rules.6 The state would offer blanket ﬁscal reliefs and aids of a social nature, granted to individual con-
sumers, i.e. measures in conformity with the rules on state aid (Art. 107 TFEU) that do not affect the scope of Articles 101,
102, or 106 TFEU. It would not create state monopolies or companies entrusted with exclusive rights. Possible cartels
between commercial insurance and social services providers would be matters for the standard application of Article 101
(1), or, in justiﬁed cases, would be exempted from the prohibition under Article 101(3) TFEU. The development in most
countries, however, went the other way starting from the 1960s, and the social security systems have taken up precisely
those elements that the founding fathers of a social market model warned against: compulsory collective solidarity, gen-
erous social security, exclusive rights for entities providing social services, a guaranteed minimumwage, etc. Should the EU,
when seeking now to return to the social market model, act against these elements of social schemes shared by the majority
of EU Member States?
To some extent, this is so. Contemporary proponents of a social market economy are critical of ﬁnancially unsustainable
welfare states, which have developed a mentality of welfare dependency in their clients, a low level of responsibility for
their own destiny and a tendency to abuse the beneﬁts provided free of charge. Not only German authors who have been
consistently updating the model of a social market economy (Zweig, 1980; Eisel, 2012; Franke & Gregosz, 2013), but also
supporters of the welfare state modernisation from the UK (Giddens, 2014) or the south wing of the EU (Gil-Robles, 2014)
emphasise that the future does not lie either in the leftist defence of universal social security entitlements or in the right-
wing policy of austerity that deepens social divisions and causes social conﬂicts. Virtually all without exception consider the
state-guaranteed system based on compulsory solidarity only a subsidiary “emergency brake” and put the emphasis on
what Anthony Giddens calls a “social investment state”, i.e. on measures that increase the opportunities of individuals in the
labour market or his/her individual business. This means measures to encourage the individual initiative and to remove the
regulatory barriers that discourage it. The redistribution of collected taxes should therefore, ﬁrst of all, ensure that everyone
gets, and even repeatedly during his or her lifetime, the possibility of access to education, to the market, and to a profession.
Only a minor part of the social budget should provide the necessities to those who, despite these social investment mea-
sures have become needy.7 This concept looks closer to economic reality than the provision of all-embracing welfare
regardless of individual effort and cost to society. However, does this approach to social security also conform more to
competition rules?
Practice shows that the source of tension between social and competition rules has developed hand in hand with the
gradual liberalisation of state provided services when, in the interest of greater efﬁciency, the market and the private
initiative were admitted into systems that had been previously fully guaranteed, ﬁnanced and controlled the state. If the
entire system of help in situations when a person is not able to help him/herself (injury, illness, age, job loss, etc.) were
excluded from the operation of market forces and remained entrusted exclusively to state organisations providing services
“from the cradle to the grave”, there would be no economic activities carried out by undertakings and the competition law
would not be applicable at all. It is no coincidence that the CJ judgments about who should also be considered as an
undertaking within the meaning of competition law began to proliferate from the 1990s, when private commercial6 Where the state performs its basic functions (the exercise of “imperium”) and uses the monopoly of state coercion in the public interest, then even if
it transferred certain powers to an entity distinct from the state, there is no market and there is no potential for competition with private operators. More
details in (Winterstein, 1999, p. 328–329).
7 Typical social market economy measures primarily include employment policy, support for SMEs and small investors as a way to individual welfare,
the mandatory participation of all people with private income in social risk insurance, in which employees contribute together with employers. Fur-
thermore, it includes a reasonably progressive income tax in order to ﬁnance an education system open to all and social protection for the most needy. The
question of wages and employee beneﬁts should not be solved by the state, but through collective bargaining between social partners.
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Fritz Elser v Macroton, 1991; SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol (1994); Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de
France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon (1993); Diego Calì & Figli Srl v Servizi ecologici porto di
Genova SpA (SEPG) (1997); Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (1999); Federación
Española de Empresas de Technología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities, 2003; Firma
Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz (2001); AOK Bundesverband, Bundesverband der landwirtschaftlichen
Krankenkassen, Verband der Angestelltenkrankenkassen eV, Verband der Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen, Bundesknappschaft and
See-Krankenkasse v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co., 2004).
In short, it could be argued that the unsustainability of state-sponsored and organised welfare and the subsequent partial
transition to an efﬁciency driven by private initiative and competition has created a new potential of conﬂict with com-
petition law. Quite understandably, the full transition to the competition-based ideal of individually contracted and ﬁnanced
insurance against all odds of life proved unrealistic, since the massive “solidarity” redistribution from those with sufﬁcient
income to those with low or no income cannot be stopped that simply. Furthermore, the social market economy model also
takes into account the role of the social partners and their collective bargaining, which would result in binding agreements
on labour cost, or a sector system of mandatory insurance. Also, it still appears to be more acceptable to compensate the
costs of providing universally accessible public services wih one selected provider, than creating complex systems of
individual aid to consumers who ﬁnd themselves out of the situation in which the market by itself would provide themwith
transport, health or education services. These mixed situations in which cartels and monopolies can have a social mission,
provide far more fertile ground for interesting and complex competition cases than the situation with zero, or completely
free competition.4. Protection of competition and social objectives – outline of the traditional approach
The UNCTAD study on exceptions to the application of competition rules is based on a premise that is in compliance with
the concept of a social market economy: “competition law should be a general law of general application, that is the law
should apply to all sectors and all economic agents in an economy engaged in the commercial production and supply of
Goods and Services.” (Khemani, 2002, p. 5). What at ﬁrst glance looks like an effort to perfect competition in all countries in
the world, not just in the EU, however, is everywhere mitigated by numerous exceptions consisting of either the full
exemption of certain activities or entities from the scope of competition law, or in the provision of case by case exemptions
from speciﬁc prohibitions. This basic scheme - exclusion from the application of competition rules or an exemption from
their ban - can also be used to examine the relationship between EU competition law and the social components of the
social market economy. The EU itself so far has no accepted methodology of how to “integrate public policy considerations
in competition decisions” and numerous exceptions (and exceptions to these exceptions, which limit their scope) must be
inferred from the case law, which evolves over time (Monti, 2007, p. 112).
First, there is an exemption provided by Protocol 26 of the Treaty for non-economic services of general interest, which
appears to be full scale and unconditional. This category of services includes statutory and complementary social security
schemes, as well as customised essential services provided directly to the person (European Commission, 2013). This does
not mean, however, that activities whose declared aim is social, whose functioning is non-proﬁt based, and whose clients
are individuals requiring support and assistance, are en masse excluded from the provisions of the Treaties, including their
antitrust articles. The Commission itself notes that some social services of general interest are subject to competition
regulation. This exception to the exception are those services which instead of being the exercising of state monopoly power
and regulatory functions, meet the deﬁnition of economic activity and are therefore carried out by undertakings within the
meaning of competition law. CJ case law, long before the Lisbon Treaty, inferred that economic activity means the offering
such goods or services (i.e. not just purchasing them for the needs of hospitals, nursing homes, etc.) that would, at least
potentially, be also provided by private commercial entities (Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macroton GmbH, 1991; Fed-
eración Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities (2006)). Neither
public status alone nor social purpose is sufﬁcient to exclude the activity from being “economic” and the bodies operating
them from being “undertakings”.
The dividing line can be traced, according to settled case-law of the CJ, around activities that are performed without any
consideration by the state or on behalf of the state, as part of its duties in the social ﬁeld. Non-economic social services will
therefore be those provided by a compulsory, solidarity-based system of insurance (health, retirement, social) where
contributions, as well as beneﬁt payments, are ﬁxed by the legislator and distributed beneﬁts thus do not match the size of
individual contributions (Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-
Roussillon, 1993; Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance, Société Paternelle-Vie, Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie
and Caisse d’Assurance et de Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, 1995; José
García and others v Mutuelle de Prévoyance Sociale d’Aquitaine and others, 1996; Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v
INAIL, 2002; Freskot AE v Elliniko Dimosio Freskot, 2003). If these conditions are simultaneously met, the CJ even allows
“some competition” and still considers the entities involved as not having the status of undertakings. It admitted that in its
decision of 2004 regarding German sickness funds (AOK Bundesverband, Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK),
Bundesverband der Innungskrankenkassen, Bundesverband der landwirtschaftlichen Krankenkassen, Verband der
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Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co (2004)where, according to the Court, the competitive bidding of minor beneﬁts in order
to attract clients did not convert health insurance companies into subjects of competition law.
The second type of approach to behaviour with social meaning or purpose was adopted by the CJ in the cases of
agreements concluded between social partners in the context of their collective bargaining. The EU Court deﬁned this
approach at the turn of the millennium in the judgment C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie (1999); see also Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en
Havenbedrijven (1999) and Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in
Bouwmaterialen (1999). In paragraph 59 of its decision, the CJ admitted that “It is beyond question that certain restrictions of
competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the
social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to
Article 85(1) of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.” Social peace,
accepted as a goal of primary importance, may thus outweigh the interest of free competition and exclude the application of
Article 101(1) TFEU to collective agreements.
In the subsequent case law relating to cases of agreements exceeding the area of collective bargaining, where the CJ
decided that entities involved were undertakings (Wouters, Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap
(2002); David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities, 2006), the situation evolved
towards acceptance of a certain “rule of reason”. The solution here, however, is not about assessing the possible exemption
from the prohibition of agreements pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU. The “rule of reason” means that a decision is taken
about whether the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU would be applied to the agreement itself.8 Thus, the rule is not that
every agreement concluded in the exercise of collective self-government of a particular sector should escape the application
of competition law in the same vein as collective agreements between workers' and employers' organisations. It is possible,
however, as in the cases of obstacles to the free movement of goods or services on the EU Single market, to apply a test of
whether the agreement is pursuing an important public goal (or mandatory requirement), and whether the chosen
arrangement is a necessary and proportionate way to achieve such a valuable objective. The quasi-automatic immunity of
collective agreements concluded between social partners can be considered in this context as a special case within the
broader “rule of reason” approach.9
If an undertaking created under such an agreement is acting e.g. as an administrator of an insurance fund into which the
companies and their employees have an obligation to contribute, there is a danger of the abuse of a dominant position and
therefore, the need for review pursuant to Article 102 TFEU. Although some authors argue that the same “rule of reason” test
can be applied (Chalmers, Davies and Monti, 2010, p. 971), the situation seems to be a bit more complicated. In such cases, EU
competition law does not apply the principle of prohibition as it does against cartels (even the per se prohibition in hardcore
cases), but rather the principle of abuse when the sanction targets not the achievement of a dominant position, or the granting
of a monopoly, but its concrete manifestations of an anti-competitive nature. And because the obligation to contribute to a
social scheme cannot be imposed without state approval, there is also the question of the application of Article 106 TFEU, i.e.
the question of whether entrusting an undertaking with a certain exclusivity does not lead to distortions of competition and, if
so, whether such interference is necessary for the performance of social services of general interest. This approach has already
been adopted by the CJ in the aforementioned judgments Albany (paras 98 et seq.), as well as Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken
and Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV, all of them from 1999. It may be asked if a fairly detailed examination of whether the
conferred monopoly was an effective and necessary solution to the task to provide a social service is rather similar to the use of
the rule of reason in not applying Art. 101 (1), or whether it more closely resembles an assessment conducted under Article
101(3) TFEU criteria for the exemption from the prohibition.10 Whether it is one way or another, the reference to Article 106
(2) TFEU provides a good bridge to another type of socially-motivated exception from the competition rules.
The third type of approach of the EU competition law to the relationship between social and competition rules consists in
a looser interpretation of the criteria for exemption from the prohibition under Article 101(3) or, in the case of services of
general interest, pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU. Under this approach, the beneﬁts of an exemptible agreement do not
depend on produced efﬁciencies and beneﬁts for buyers in the same relevant market, but when a wider variety of positive
outcomes, including those in the social ﬁeld, are taken into account. G. Monti speciﬁed four different types of such an8 See the AG Cosmas´ Opinion in C-51/96 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, 1999, para 110: “Article 85
(1) does not apply to restrictions on competition which are essential in order to attain the legitimate aims which they pursue. That exception is based on
the idea that rules which, at ﬁrst sight, reduce competition, but are necessary precisely in order to enable market forces to function or to secure some other
legitimate aim, should not be regarded as infringing the Community provisions on competition.”
9 The fact that “workers” are not “undertakings” represents here another explanation of why competition law does not apply to agreements concluded
by them.
10 It is true that the balancing of the various objectives of the Treaty and therefore of not applying Article 101 (1) TFEU belongs to the EU authorities,
while an exception from the ban should be sought by evidential activity of the enterprises themselves. In the case of application of Article 106 (2), the
situation is somewhat blurred, as services of general interest are both a “value of the EU” (see Article 14 TFEU) and the Commission has a certain
harmonisation power towards them (Article 106(3) TFEU), while their deﬁnition and organisation remain in the hands of the Member States and to whom
they are supposed to certify with concrete evidence that the performance of these services is efﬁcient enough, and that its sustainability requires an
exemption from the competition rules. See for instance, (Schweitzer, 2011, p. 40–41).
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redeﬁnition of economic efﬁciency to include other public policy consideration, (ii) use of non-economic beneﬁts as factors
to tip the balance in favour of granting an exception, (iii) granting of conditional exception and use of remedies to achieve
the public policy goal, (iv) ﬁnding that the non-competition consequences of the agreement are of such importance that if
an agreement is inefﬁcient but contributes to another Community policy, it is exempted (Monti, 2007, p. 115–117).
However, during the so-called modernisation of EU competition law, i.e. right after the year 2000, the Commission
adopted a less accommodative stance and did not take any decision that would further develop this approach. On the
contrary, in its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) from 2004 (paras 42–43) (European Commission, 2004) it
refused to take into account the beneﬁts of an agreement which would not ﬁt the efﬁciency requirement understood in the
economic sense, or the beneﬁts that would be located in another market or addressed to another category of beneﬁciaries.
In the newmillennium, the Commission conﬁrmed this narrow standard in its negative attitude towards the so-called “crisis
cartels” (Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd. and Barry Brothers Meats Ltd, 2008), by which it
indicated that “the survival of an industry and employment, it seems, no longer enters into the equation” (Witt, 2013, p. 20).
Against this view of the Commission stand the decisions of the EU General Court that did not require such rigour and
explicitly admitted other beneﬁts (For instance Compagnie Générale maritime and others v. Commission (2002); CMA GCM
and Others v Commission (2003)). In this regard, it could be expected that the highlighting of social objectives in the EU
Lisbon Treaty would not only push in favour of the extended interpretation of the criteria for exemption under Article 101
(3), but also 106(2) TFEU. Last but not least, the Commission has also mitigated its modernisation fervour based on neo-
liberal economics since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis in 2008.12
Although it is not typical for cases where social goals and impacts are taken into account, two other means of escape
from EU competition rules cannot be ruled out. Some agreements between undertakings may fall under the limits set for the
de minimis rule, or may be set aside as purely local issues with no impact on trade between the EU Member States. These
cases of negligible impact on competition, speciﬁcally on inter-state trade, would nevertheless be rare in the social ﬁeld, as
the effectiveness of social measures usually requires agreements between labour and capital of at least regional scope, or the
collective decisions of the autonomous bodies of a profession or industry, as evidenced by the above-mentioned cases. For
the sake of completeness, however, it is also possible to include these two paths in the outlined methodology.
A table summing up the approaches explained above, accommodating EU competition law with social security schemes
and outlining the successive steps of analysis, would look as follows (the subsequent step comes into consideration
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The conclusions and the table presented in the previous section are based on decisions taken by the EU competition
authorities before 2009, i.e. before the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, thus at a time when the EU did not pursue the
objective of a highly competitive social market economy. Although the new socially-oriented provisions of this Treaty may
lead to the conclusion that the possibility of exclusion of socially oriented activities from the application of counteracting
rules of the EU law could only further expand, the answer can hardly be that straightforward.uoted as examples of a wider application of article 101(3) TFEU criteria: Commission
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even though - unlike their Advocates General (Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-515/08 (2010); Opinion of AG Kokott in
C-557/12 (2014)) - a reference to it has never been made.13 In the post-Lisbon period, the CJ adopted decisions which
strengthened the impact of EU measures ensuring non-discrimination, equal treatment and individual social-employment
rights (paid annual leave, rights of family members or migrating workers), as well as the decision that earned it criticism
from the European Left for anti-social decision making. This was the case of judgments dealing with a conﬂict between the
liberal freedoms of the EU internal market and the nationally or locally speciﬁc (often adopted by social partners) conditions
imposing some duties on the winning contractor in public procurement tenders, or setting the retirement age, or regulating
temporary agency employment.14 The CJ basically followed there on its jurisprudence Laval and Viking from the pre-Lisbon
period that had been so harshly criticised by trade unions and left-wing activists. Applying the usual “breach-justiﬁcation-
proportionality” test, the CJ came to conclusions that did not please those who had hoped that under the Lisbon Treaty,
social rights would not be seen as an uncertain exception to the freedoms of the EU Single market, and that they would
become superior to those freedoms. When dealing with single market issues, the CJ therefore continues the uneasy bal-
ancing of economic freedoms and social rights, thus being of no help to politicians who inscribed an objective in the Treaty
without reaching a speciﬁc agreement on its meaning and implementation.
In the competition ﬁeld, as shown above, the CJ used to be more social-minded, even before the Lisbon Treaty. The judges´
approach has suggested that EU rules on free movement and non-discrimination are essentially universal in their application,
while EU competition rules are designed to strengthen and complete the single market only where economic activities and proﬁt
goals prevail. The Table of exemptions from the rules of competition (above) is certainly not applicable to the freedoms of the EU
single market. In the post-Lisbon period, the CJ has several times been given the opportunity to ponder social rights and
undistorted competition requirements when dealing with references for preliminary rulings from national courts. It is quite
symptomatic that these cases were ﬁrst dealt with at a national level, not by the Commission´s decision. In the context of
decentralisation of EU competition law enforcement, the Commission has been focusing on large-scale international cartels and
abuses of dominance by multinational companies. For cases with social elements, however, it is quite typical that they originate
from local disputes about the consequences of social partners´ agreements in the different sectors of a national economy.
The oldest of these CJ decisions is the case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v Maschinenbau- und Metall-
Berufsgenossenschaft (2009) (i.e. before the actual effect of the Lisbon Treaty). In substance, it was about the legal obli-
gation of businesses operating in Germany to become members, in respect of insurance against accidents at work and
occupational diseases, of the Berufsgenossenschaft (a professional association), to which they materially and territorially
belong. They are then obliged to pay the association their insurance contributions calculated on the basis of the wages and
salaries of the insured persons. The Kattner company intended to take out private insurance against the risks involved,
which brought them into conﬂict with the professional association in the engineering and metalworking sector (“MMB”).
The CJ had, among other things, to address the question whether the MMB was an undertaking subject to Articles 101 and
102 TFEU. On the basis of the standard assessment derived from their previous case law, the Court ﬁrst explored the nature





and Ot“…a body such as the employers’ liability insurance association at issue in the main proceedings, to which undertakings in
a particular branch of industry and a particular territory must be afﬁliated in respect of insurance against accidents at work
and occupational diseases, is not an undertaking within the meaning of those provisions, but fulﬁls an exclusively social
function, where such a body operates within the framework of a scheme that applies the principle of solidarity and is
subject to State supervision, which it is for the referring court to verify.” (Decision, part 1)By this decision, the CJ thus conﬁrmed its earlier established approach towards managing the bodies of social insurance
systems and repeated the criteria that must be fulﬁlled to exclude them from the category of undertakings, and therefore
from the application of EU competition law. In the spirit of the already cited case law AOK Bundesverband, the ECJ main-
tained the stance that: “the fact that employers’ liability insurance associations such as MMB are given that degree of latitude,
within the framework of a system of self-management, in order to lay down the factors that determine the amount of con-
tributions and beneﬁts cannot as such change the nature of those associations’ activity.” (para 61) In the same vein, the non-
undertaking status of MMB was not affected by the fact that providers from the other Member States were able to offer
similar services.
Another notable decision was taken by the CJ in the case C-437/09 AG2R Prévoyance v. Beaudout Pere et Fils SARL in March
2011. Its factual side was quite similar to the Kattner case: a local dispute where the plaintiff, the company Beaudout Pere et
Fils SARL, refused to participate in the system of compulsory health insurance managed by a non-proﬁt organisation AG2R
for the whole sector of artisanal bakery in France. The difference, however, laid in the fact that under French law, the
participation of employers in such schemes may be stipulated in a collective agreement between the representatives ofThe General Court referred to it once in the decision T-565/98 (Corsica Ferries France SAS, 2012), where it accepted that for a reasonable private
r in the social market economy, the payment of an additional redundancy payment would constitute a legitimate and appropriate practice,
eless it stressed that social or political goals cannot stand alone and cannot exclusively prevail over economic logic. See paras 82–83 of the
nt.
See for instance, the CJ rulings in cases (Commission v. Germany, 2010; Gisela Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges, 2010; Reinhard Prigge
hers v Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 2011; Commission v. Belgium, 2011; Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund, 2014).
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employees and employers in the given sector. In its decision, the CJ reiterated its approach to collective agreements of the
social partners aimed at improving the conditions of work and employment: they do not fall, because of their nature and
objectives, within the scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU. This is true regardless of the fact that accession to such an agreement is
made compulsory for companies of a particular sector in a particular Member State. As Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply to
such an agreement, the EU law (namely Article 4(3) TEU - the duty of loyalty) could not prevent a Member State from
decreeing the participation in it mandatory without any exemption from this requirement (paras 29–38). Exclusion of
collective agreements from the EU anti-cartel law that the CJ ﬁrst found in Albany has thus been reafﬁrmed.
Given that the nonproﬁt entity AG2R was chosen by the social partners themselves to manage their insurance from
companies offering services on the market of health and social insurance, the CJ came to the conclusion that although the
system was endowed with a high degree of solidarity, the AG2R showed a remarkable degree of independence. In such a
case it was very likely, according to the CJ, that the AG2R was an undertaking engaged in economic activity, albeit it had to
be assessed in detail under the particular circumstances by the national court. If the AG2R was an undertaking, the question
must be raised of the application of Articles 102 and 106 TFEU, since this undertaking had been entrusted by the Minister
with the exclusive right to collect payments and manage the insurance scheme. The CJ stayed here with its settled case law
from the 1990s and noted that the abuse of a dominant position could occur if the statutory conditions themselves led such
an undertaking to abusive conduct, especially if the grant of an exclusive right created a situation in which the monopoly
was apparently unable to satisfy the demand for the service (Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elsner v Macroton, 1991). Since the same
insurance services, maybe even on better terms, had been offered on the French market by other providers, the creation of
such a monopoly for the whole business sector was likely to restrict competition (although it had not been proven that
businesses insured with AG2R were dissatisﬁed with its services). The CJ therefore decided to examine whether the
exemption from competition constraints may be granted pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU, and applied to undertakings
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (paras 70–73).
The Court itself, based on facts known to it, through relatively brief considerations (paras 74–81), referring to its earlier decisions
of cases Albany, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken and Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV from 1999, concluded that the exception of
Article 106(2) TFEU was applicable to the insurance monopoly of the AG2R. Insurance at an affordable price requires that the
system is not left by contributors representing a lesser insurance risk. This requirement can justify the exclusive right of the AG2R to
manage a system in which participation is made compulsory for everyone in the sector. Without such exclusivity, it would not be
able to perform a task of general economic interest under “economically acceptable conditions”. Hence, the CJ concluded that:
“Articles 102 TFEU and 106 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main pro-
ceedings, public authorities from granting a provident society an exclusive right to manage that scheme, without any possibility for
undertakings within the occupational sector concerned to be exempted from afﬁliation to that scheme.” (Decision, part 2)
The CJ approach, in this case, answers the question of whether admitting more commerce and competition into the
provision of social security must lead to a conﬂict with EU competition rules. A Member State, by supporting the decision
made by social partners that choose their exclusive administrator or social insurance scheme from commercial entities,
empowered the undertaking with a service of general interest. There would be no complete exemption from the EU rules of
competition for such a monopoly, as there would have been in the case where the system were managed by a body
established under a speciﬁc law and subject to regulation and control by the State. The conﬂict with the competition rules
still may not occur. The CJ, undoubtedly aware of “the inevitable tension between social security law and competition law”,
offered a very friendly interpretation of exception pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU. Should a solidarity-based mechanism
ensuring the attainment of the social objective become unsustainable “under economically acceptable conditions” for a
company in charge when it is subject to competitive pressures, then EU competition law grants an exception. This is the
conclusion reached by the CJ in favour of the AG2R, without referring to the need to assess speciﬁc conditions by the
national judge, as the Court did in earlier decisions.
This positive approach by the CJ to the social partners' collective agreements securing workers' rights was recently
conﬁrmed by the judgment in case C-413/13 Kunsten en Informatie Media v. Staat der Nederlanden adopted in December
2014. In this case, a trade union representing musicians, both employed and self-employed ones, negotiated a collective
agreement with an organisation representing orchestras in the Netherlands. Because the self-employed musicians were also
included in the agreement, the Dutch competition authority (in accordance with the European Commission) found that the
CJ jurisprudence exempting collective agreements between representatives of labour and capital was not applicable to the
case. The CJ in response to a preliminary question from the Dutch court conﬁrmed that the self-employed should normally
be treated as undertakings and agreements with their participation were therefore potential cartels not falling under the
exception created by the decision by Albany case law and conﬁrmed by e.g. the recent decision AG2R Prévoyance (para 30).
At the same time, however, the CJ distinguished between the self-employed and the falsely self-employed, using the
functional approach: those engaged in paid work, without being able to independently determine their own conduct and
without bearing the ﬁnancial and economic risks of their entrepreneurship, ﬁt far more into the category of “worker”, as
deﬁned by EU law. Based on this reasoning, the CJ concluded that the principle of the Albany decision could also be applied
when dealing with an agreement involving the falsely self-employed. Article 101(1) TFEU, therefore, would not apply to
their agreement. The CJ even stressed (para 40) the beneﬁcial social effects of such an approach: falsely self-employed
individuals as service providers covered by the agreement will be guaranteed higher basic pay; they will pay higher con-
tributions to pension insurance schemes and will be eligible for a higher level of pension in the future.
V. Šmejkal / International Comparative Jurisprudence 1 (2015) 33–4342The CJ obviously left it to the national court to determine whether participants in collective agreements were actually
falsely self-employed in the sense as deﬁned in its judgment. It is essential, however, that this judgment responds to another
trend of contemporary society, which is the replacing of traditional employment jobs by self-employed persons hired for the
same type of work performed under the same conditions as if they were employees. By rejecting the negative opinion of
competition authorities, the CJ took a signiﬁcantly more accommodating position for the social security of all market
participants in the actual position of “workers”. In the words of the judgment: “Service providers in a situation comparable to
that of those workers, that a provision of a collective labour agreement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which sets
minimum fees for those self-employed service providers, does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.”6. Conclusions
So far, only a limited number of judgments from the post-Lisbon period that could be analysed have been covered.
Nevertheless, it is possible to rely on the following facts, which undoubtedly arise out of them.
The CJ remains faithful to its case law from the 1990s, onwhich the analytical methodology of this study has been built. The case
law of Albany, Berntjens’ Poucet et Pistre, AOK Bundesverband and others has not been overcome. The exemption from EU competition
rules has been neither rejected nor narrowed. Moreover, the CJ in its present judgments constantly refers to this case law as the
basis of the EU competition law approach to agreements and entities with predominantly social objectives.
On top of this, the CJ has extended the scope of the exceptions established by the older judgments to new situations
occurring in the ﬁeld of labour relations and social security. Even if the state itself was not the provider or a strict supervisor
of social insurance schemes, it might not bring them into conﬂict with the rules of competition, as was shown by the CJ in
the AG2R Prévoyance judgment where a generous application of exemption pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU was made,
without requiring any detailed evidence from the Member State and its national court. Similarly, the transition of dependent
workers from regular employment relationships to self-employed status does not mean their exclusion from collective
bargaining, which enjoys exemption from the provisions of Article 101(1) TFEU.
Although the CJ did not refer in any of the cited judgments to Article 3(3) TEU or to the EU target of a highly competitive social
market economy, it seems that its stance on issues of protection of competition is quite helpful towards this new EU goal. If, following
the European Commission's opinion, the social component of the EU's model of social market economy consists ﬁrst of all in ensuring
suitable working conditions, the guarantee of individual employment rights and the role of social partners and their dialogue as the
main tool for their further development (Andor, 2011), then EU competition law is not a stumbling block barring the way.References
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